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PRIVITY?-AN OBSOLETE APPROACH TO
THE LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS TO
THIRD PARTIES
Albert G. Besser*
INTRODUCTION

Accompanying the unparalleled economic growth experienced by
this nation during the twentieth century has been an increased
sophistication in the methodology required to accurately monitor and
report on corporate financial matters. The accounting profession, in
the course of its audit function, plays a major role in the complex
numbers game of corporate finance by furnishing the business community with data purporting to indicate the true fiscal condition of
commercial enterprises.'
However, the auditing mistakes of accountants often result in
significant losses to those persons who rely upon financial statements.
PUtheHmUr, the recent recession, with .t abundance of economic
woes, has accelerated the drive by disappointed investors to find a
"deep pocket" from which to recoup their losses. 2 Responding to
* B.A., Yale University; LL.B., Yale University; Member, New Jersey & New York
Bars.
I The audit is a primary function of accounting firms. The profession also provides
services in the areas of tax planning, management consulting, and executive recruiting.
See Fiflis, Current Problems of Accoun tants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28
VAND. L. REV. 31, 34-35 (1975).

In his description of a full audit, Professor Fiflis structures the accountant's function
into the following four-step process:

(1)preliminary fact-finding to familiarize the accountant with "the nature of the
client's business, its operations and organization;- id. at 37,
(2) formulation of the specific audit procedure which will be employed;
(3) performance of the audit; and
(4) report of findings.
Id. at 35-42.
2 There has been a significant rise in the number of lawsuits brought against accountants in the past decade. In 1966 it was reported that approximately 100 suits were
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these increased challenges to the work product of accountants, recent
judicial decisions have expanded the scope of accountants' liability to
their own clients 3 and have eroded their traditional common law insulation from liability to third persons with whom they are not in
privity.

4

Simultaneously, a second battleground has developed, with numerous plaintiffs proceeding against accountants under section 10b of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it unlawful
"[t]o use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive device . . . in
contravention" of SEC rules "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security," 5 and its companion SEC rule 10b-5, which also
makes it unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact. "6 This statute and its accompanying
rule had been viewed as particularly useful in avoiding the common
law privity obstacles. 7 However, momentum under the federal securities laws has been thwarted, at least temporarily, by Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, s in which the Supreme Court recently held that
in various stages of litigation. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, Col. 6, at 13, col. 2. By 1973,
"more than 500 companies ha[d] litigation or claims in process involving auditors."
Hawes, Truth in Financial Statements: An Introduction, 28 \VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 & ii.1
(1975). Recently The New York Times reported that about 300 suits were in progress
against less than twelve of the largest domestic accounting firms. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23,
1975, § 3, at 14, col. 8. It has also been estimated that over two hundred claims are
pending against the smaller firms. See Griffin. The Beleaguered Aecounta tits: A
Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759, 759 (1976).
The reasons for the increase in litigation are complex, but some contributing factors
may be the recession, the poptularity of the class action proceeding, and the practice of
many attorneys of charging fees on a contingent basis, as well as the negligence of
accountants. See id. at 760-61.
3 See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 1 12,
122 (S.ID.N.Y. 1974) (accountant's duties to client and third parties not fulfilled merely
by following generally accepted accounting principles). 1136 Tenants' Corp. v. \Max
Rothenberg & Co., 36 App. Div. 2d 804, 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1008 (1971), aff'd, 30
N.Y.2d 585, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972) (same duty of care applied, in dictum, to the preparation of unaudited financial reports as had previously' been reserved only for the
preparation of audited statements).
4 See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-93 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan
v. Kanne, 170 N.V.2d 395, 401-03 (Iowa 1969). For a general discussion of accountants'
liability to third parties see Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability For Defective
Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 436 (1964); Note, Public Accountants and Attorney/s: Negligence and the Third Parttl, 47 NOrTRE DAMaE LAxy. 588 (1971).
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b--5(h) (1975).
7 In the context of the federal securities laws, privity is no longer a iprerequisite to
recovery. See, e.g., Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Stpp. 94, 104 (N.D. 111. 1967);
Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). For further discussion of the
issue of privity in role 104-5 actions see notes 90-95 infra and accompanyinog text.
1 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
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mere negligence will not subject an accountant to liability under
these securities fraud provisions. Such actions require a demonstration of scienter, defined as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud," 9 a burden much more difficult to
sustain than mere deviation from the reasonable behavior standard by
which negligence is determined.
With the range of federal actions now limited by Hochfelder, and
the rationale for seeking pendent federal jurisdiction thus eliminated,
a rebirth of' state actions and accentuated drives to expand the
accountant's common law liability under traditional negligence can be
anticipated. It is that area of potential exposure with which this article is primarily concerned. Focusing on the common law setting, this
article will examine the role played by the privity of contract doctrine
in determining the parties to whom accountants and other professionals have been held legally responsible for their negligent misrepresentations. 10 A balancing approach as an alternative to the strict
'Id.at 1:381 & i. 12. The plaintiffs in Hochfelder had been victimized by a fraudulent investment scheme perpetrated by the president of a registered broker-dealer. They
alleged that if the defendants had properly conducted their audits, mandated by section
17(a) of the 1934 Act, for which they had been engaged by the broker, the fraud would
have been detected. There was no allegation that the defendants knew of the fraud
m-only
a claim of negligence. Id. at 1378-80.
The Court's holding that scienter is a necessary ingredient in lOb-5 cases was
presaged by several circuits. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622 (5th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cii. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1:305-06 (2d Cir. 1973); Shemtob v.
Shiti s, HaijIllll & Co., 418 F.2d 442, 445 (2dl Cir. 1971). But see WVhite v. Ab.am,
495 F.2d 724, 734-36 (9th Cir. 1974); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1238 (8th
Cir. 1970); Myzel v. Fields, :386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 6.34, 6.37 (7th Cir. 1963).
In Lanza v. Drexel, supra, the Second Circuit dismissed a 10b-5 action brought by
purchasers against a corporate director for failure to investigate false representations and
fraudulent omissions of material facts of' which other corporate officers and directors
were guilty, because the defendant had no actual knowledge that hlsse representations
and material omissions bad been made. 479 F.2d at 1280--81. The court concluded that
'[a]bsent knowledge or substantial participation we have refused to impose such affirmative duties of disclosure upon Rule 10b-5 defendants." Id. at 1302. In addition, the
court held that the express language of section 10b "bars adoption of a negligence standard," id. at 1305, and that, at the very least, "willful or reckless disregard for the truth,"
must be demonstrated, id. at 1306. In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court deliberately
avoided deciding "whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." 96 S.Ct. at 1381 n.12.
15There is no question concerning the duty owed by accountants to their clients'to
perform the contracted services without negligence or fraud. The audit contract imposes
a duty upon the accountant to render services to the client with a recognized degree of
skill and judgment. Failure to exercise the necessary care-a breach of the auditor's
professional obligation-may result in an action by the client in contract or tort for any
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application of privity will then be proposed.
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT AND
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY

Ever since the 1931 decision in Ultramares v. Touche," the first

major judicial discussion of an accountant's liability to non-clients,
courts have been reluctant to extend a cause of action to third parties
not in privity with a defendant-accountant unless fraud or conduct
closely resembling fraud is alleged.1 2 In Ultrarnares, a party who had
relied on a negligently prepared audit was denied recovery for his
economic losses because of the lack of contractual privity with the
accountant.' 3 In oft-quoted language, Judge Cardozo articulated the
fear that
[i]f liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. 14

A requirement that parties be in privity of contract before a duty
of care is imposed is obviously not of concern only to accountants.
The "assault upon the citadel of privity,"' 5 as recognized by Judge
pecuniary loss suffered. Most clients' actions are spawned by the accountant's failure to
discover embezzlements commited by the client's employees or the client's use of
negligently prepared financial statements. See Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REV. 797, 797-812 (1959); Levitin, supra note
4, at 437-39; 36 IOWA L. REV. 319, 320-21 (1951).
11255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
12See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 5.3-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
758 (1937); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 111-12, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418-19
(1938); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20, 24-25 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd,
285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955); Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [19511
2 K.B. 164, 196-207 (C.A.).
13255 N.Y. at 173-89, 174 N.E. at 442-48. For an expanded discussion of Ultramares see notes 27-33 infra and accompanying text.
14 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
This fear echoes the concern expressed by Lord Abinger in Winterbottom v. Wright,
10 M. & W. 109, 114-15, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842), that unlimited liability
might ensue if privity was not retained in third party negligence actions. For a detailed
discussion of\Winterbottoin see note 15 infra.
1 255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445.
The privity doctrine evolved in the context of physical torts. By the middle of the
nineteenth century it was a concept firmly embedded in the common law. See, e.g.,
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Tollit v. Sherstone, 5 M. & W. 283, 151 Eng. Rep. 120 (Ex. 1839). In Winterbottom, the plaintiff,
injured when a mailcoach which he was hired to drive collapsed, was denied relief
because he was not in contractual privity with the defendant who had been responsible
for the repair and maintenance of the coach. Id. at 110, 113-15, 152 Eng. Rep. at
403-05. Lord Abinger reasoned that
if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the
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Cardozo in Ultramares, has been rapid and effective in a number of
road, wvho was injured by the upsetting of the coach, night bring a similar
action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties
who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to
which I can see no limit, would ensue.

Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. The general rule that evolved from Winterbotton was
that negligent performance of contractual obligations leading to physical injuries would
render one liable only to those persons privy to the contiact. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 93, at 622 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as

PROSSER].

The \Vinterbottom rule reflected pre-i dustrial revolution concepts of social justice.
Professor Seavey has criticized \Vilitelcbottom as either
al interesting illistration of judicial frailty, or..
an example of temnporarv
protvctive judicial legislation given th manifacitireis until they became' sufficiently strong as a gro1) to pay for the consequences of their employees' instakes.
Seavey, 'iJ. Justice Cardozo f110 the Lau of Torts, 52 -tARXv.L. REV. .372, :379 (1939).
Later courts, more in tune with rapidlv changing socio-conoinic conditions, recognized the need to effectively limit the rule's potential boad application. See Note, Ac'couitants' Liability to Third Pati'. fiol fill
Audit, 52 \IARQ. L. REV. 158, 160-61 (1968).
Thus, exceptions were soon carved out of \'interhottom's absolute privity requireilent.

For a comprehensive discussion of the pre-1900 exceptions to this general rule see
Huset v.J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870-72 (8th Cir. 1903).
An early exception, when the defendant's acts posed a serious threat to public
safet', was recognized in Thomas v. \Vinchester, 6 N.Y. :397 (1852). In Tlomas, a drug
vendoi was held liable, despite the absence of'privits, to a remote purchaser, who had
ingested a poisonous drug negligently mislabeled by the vendor. Id. at 407-10. The
court took cognizance of' \Viutei bottoM's third party' dlutylimitations but, nevertheless,
expanded the scope of a negligent partys obligation to the general public where "death
or great bodily harm of some person was the natural and almost inevitable consequence" of the negligent act. Id. at 408-10. The court did not reject Winterbottoln, but
rather felt the holding of that case to be applicable only in situatioins \'here (1)the
general public was not the tiItimate toresecable reliant, i.e.,
where "[io]lstortunie to
third persons, not parties to the contract, would not lie a natiral and necessary consequence of the ...negligence," and (2) sshere "such negligence is not an act inminently
dangerous to human life." Id. at 408.
An English court recognized a second major exception to Winterbottoin, based also
on a threat to public safety. In Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883), a defendant drydock owner, under contract with a shipowner, constructed a scaffolding to be
utilized by a ship painter's wvorkmnan. The woirkinan xas injur ed \\Then the scaffolding
collapsed due to unfit support ropes. ld. at 506. The court held that the dockowner had
a duty to the workman to take reasonable care to supply and construct a scaffolding that
wias fit for the intended use. Finding that this duty had been breached, the court iinposed liability on the defendant for injuries sustained by the workman. /d. at 509-10,
514. In considering this duty, judge Brett, by' way of dictum, concluded:
[\V]benever one Person is by ciicuminstances placed in such a position With regard to another that every one of' ordinary sense who did think would at once
recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his owvn conduct with
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or
property of the other, a duty ai ises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
danger.

Id. at 509. See Devlin v.Smith, 89 N.Y. 471 (1882).
Heavcen's retreat from \linterbottout \\,as not, however, extreme. In \Viiterlbottom,
Lord Abinger was concerned with an unknown and potentially limitless class of plain-
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areas. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 16 virtually eliminated privity
as a relevant consideration in products liability actions where strict liability has been imposed on manufacturers for personal injuries resulting from defective products. 17 Liability for negligent misrepresentation has also been extended to parties not in privity when injury to
tangible interests has been sustained. 18 But where negligent misrepresentation has resulted solely in pecuniary loss, a greater reluctance
to extend liability to those not in privity can be found,' 9 because of
the fear of opening the door to "unlimited liability" in favor of an
"indeterminate class."
Although commentators have argued that the different treatment
afforded economic and physical losses should be eliminated, 2 ° the
tiffs; the Heacen court merely involved itself with plaintiffs who were ostensibly invited
to use the services provided by the defendant dockowner. Thus, much of the policy
which had dictated the result illWinterbottolo was inapplicable to Heaven . Following
Heaven, the role of privity in negligence actions was to decline even further. See notes
16-48 infra and accompanying text.
16217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
17Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. See, e.g\,
oraca v. Ford lotor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332
A.2d 599 (1975); Santor v. A & NI Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also
PROSSER, supra note 15, § 98; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) (1965).
The MacPherson court, considering whether a defendant car manufacturer owed a
duty of care to anyone other than an immediate purchaser, adopted the foreseeability
concept originally applied in Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), to objects which
are inherent instruments of destruction, and extended it to items which are "reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made." 217 N.Y. at 384-85, 389,
Ill N.E. at 1051, 1053. This quality of dangerousness, when coupled with the
manufacturer's knowledge that the product would be used by remote purchasers, was
sufficient to impose liability on the manufacturer who failed to properly construct or
inspect the article for defects. Id. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053. For a discussion of Judge
Cardozo's opinion in MlacPherson see Seavey, sitpra note 15, at 376-79.
Thus, in cases involving physical harm caused by a manufacturer's negligence, the
last vestige of \Vinterbottoni's general rule of nonliability without privity was consumed
by the recognized exceptions. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1225,
1233 (1937); Prosser, The Assault Uponi the Citadel (Strict Liabilityt o the Cmn.siicr),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960).
I PROSSER, supira note 15, § 105, at 68:3.
19Pecuniary loss has historically been afforded less protection than physical injury
in all tort actions. Professor James gives this explanation for the courts' objection to
extending liability to allow recovery for indirect economic loss: "the physical consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but the indirect economic repercussions of negligence may be wider, indeed virtually open-ended." James, Limitations on
Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 43, 45 (1972) (footnote omitted). But business realities are changing, or at least
society's view of the significance of economic loss is evolving, so that pecuniary loss by
third parties may now be compensated in some circumstances. See generally Comment,
Foreseeabilityof Third-Party Economic Injuries-A Problem in Analysis, 20 U. CHI. L.
REV. 283 (1953); 60 IOWA L. REV. 315 (1974).

20See, e.g., Comment, Aecounta tits'
Liabilities to Third Parties Under Coniion
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courts have departed from it only reluctantly, 2 ' and many still bar
potential plaintiffs entirely through the use of the privity doctrine.
Increasingly complex business practices have, however, heightened
the need to rely on the statements of others, and commencing in
1922 with Glanzer v. Shepard,2 2 the role of privity in suits for recovery of economic loss caused by negligent misrepresentation has slowly
been eroded.
In Glanzer, the defendants were public weighers who certified
the weight of a quantity of beans in order to establish a contract
purchase price. The purchasers of the beans, to whom the defendants
supplied a weight certificate, paid accordingly, only to discover that
the weight had been overstated. They sued to recover the excess in
price from the defendant-weighers because of the latter's negligence. 2 3 The court, speaking through Judge Cardozo, acknowledged
the absence of a contractual relationship between the two parties but,
nevertheless, held the defendants liable. 24 Judge Cardozo noted that
the duty of care owed by the defendants was not only for the benefit
of those privy to the contract, but also extended to any specific party
who would foreseeably be induced to act in reliance on the information contained in the certification. 25 Since the plaintiffs' use of and
reliance on the certification was, in the court's opinion, "a consequence which, to the weighers' knowledge, was the end and aim of
the transaction," and because "[t]he defendants held themselves out
to the public as skilled and careful in their calling," the defendants'
Law and F'cdertl Secuiritie.s Law, 9 B.C. IND. & Co_\L. L. REV. 1:37, 149 (1967); Coinme it, Auditors'" Rcsponsibilit!
ifor
1i.s i('prescntotion: Inaodeq ate Protection for Users
of Finaiwitil Statc eiit.s, 44 \V-Ssr. L. REV. 139, 181 (1968).
21 Professor James attributes this general reluctance to "pragmatic" objectionscourts' fears concerninig the effect of a finding of liability on the defendants-rather than
to any theoretical considerations. He acknowvledges that the different treatment afforded
ecoomic an(d physical losses is "crude and unreliable." James, Sup))rla note 19, at 50-51.
2223:3 N.Y. 236, 1:35 N.E. 275 (1922). For an excellent analysis of Glauzer see Seavey, .snpra note 15, at 394-98; 7 CORNELL L.(). :355 (1922); 21 Micri. L. REV. 200
(192:3).
2' 233 N.Y. at 237-38, 1:35 N.E. at 275.
24 1. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 27.5-76.
2.5ld. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the defendants
knew that the beans had been sold, and that on the faith of their certificate
payment wOUld he made. They sent a copy to the plaintiffs for the very purpose
of inducing action. All this the\, admit. In such circumstances, assumption of
the task of weighing \\,as the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the
benefit of all whose conduct \%,as to be governed.
Id. at 239, 1:35 N.E. at 176. Judge Cardozo did not discuss what role the element of
reliance would play, in such a case, but it can be inferred that a plaintiff needed only to
show that the reliance on the negligent representation was reasonable. Cf. 36 IOWA L.
REV. :319, 32:3-24 (195 1).
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duty of care was extended to encompass the plaintiff-purchasers. 26
Thus, as in the context of physical injury, the boundaries of liability imposed by contract began to give way in favor of a duty requirement sounding in tort. It logically might have been anticipated
that the Glanzer rationale would be equally applicable to accountants,
but nine years later the Ultramares court rejected this extension. The
defendant in Ultramares was a certified public accounting firm which
had been retained to perform the annual examination and certification
of Fred Stern & Company's corporate financial records. 2 7 The accountants were aware that Stern would exhibit these certified statements
to third-party creditors in order to facilitate the acquisition of business loans necessary to finance its operations, but did not know specifically the particular parties to whom the statement would be
shown. 28 The completed audit indicated that Stern's net worth ex29
ceeded $1,000,000 when, in fact, the company was insolvent.
Plaintiff-creditor, in reliance upon the statements which it had received from Stern, advanced the company loans totalling approximately $165,000. When Stern was later declared bankrupt, the plaintiff sued the accountants for the economic loss sustained, alleging that
the audit was both negligently and fraudulently performed. Having
determined that the audit had been done negligently, the court of
appeals considered at length the question of whether any duty of care
was owed to this particular plaintiff which could overcome the ab30
sence of contractual privity.
Whatever the rationale employed, it seems clear that the Ultramares court was not yet ready to destroy the privity barrier in favor
of an "indeterminate" class of potential plaintiffs, as distinguished
from the single plaintiff who was allowed to recover because of the
single transaction in Glanzer. To achieve this result, "primary" versus
"incidental or collateral" beneficiary language was utilized. Thus, the
relationship of the Glanzer purchaser who had relied on the weight
certificate, regarded by the Ultramares court as "so close" to the
transaction between the weigher and the seller "as to approach that of
privity, if not completely one with it,"3 1 was designated "primary."
233 N.Y. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275-76. Judge Cardozo concluded:
We do not need to state the duty in terms of contract or of privity. Growing out
of a contract, it has none the less an origin not exclusively contractual. Given
the contract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law.
Id.at 239, 135 N.E. at 276.
27255 N.Y. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
28 Id. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
29 Id. at 174-75, 174 N.E. at 442.
30 Id. at 176-89, 174 N.E. at 44.3-48.
311ld. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
26
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On the other hand, the persons in Ultramares to whom the client
might later exhibit the accountants' audit were only "incidentally or
collaterally" the beneficiaries thereof-much more remotely removed
from the accountant-client contract. 3 2 By this semantic hair-splitting,
the court was able to avoid what it envisaged as impending economic
catastrophe if the accounting profession were exposed to liability for
negligence to the "limitless" number of parties unknown at the moment of contract, who at some "indeterminate" time might fall upon
the accountant's work product and use it to their own detriment, suf33
fering damage in an "indeterminate" amount.
32Id. The Glanzer court could have achieved the same result through the third
party beneficiary doctrine instead of employing tort concepts, thus avoiding the emaharassing Ultramares confrontation. See, e.g., Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 234, 120
N.E. 639, 640 (1918); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 271-72 (1859).

Indeed, a recent court has viewed Glauzer as in fact a third party beneficiary case,
thus limiting its applicability. See Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291, 295
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
33 Seavey, supra note 15, at 400; see Levitin, supra note 4, at 445; Marinelli, The
Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third Parties, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
113, 118 (1971). Professor Seavey has argued that "Cardozo weakened his opinion by
making distinctions where there are no differences." Seavey, supra note 15, at 400. Such
a criticism seems well-founded. There can be no doubt that Stern reaped a substantial
benefit from the accounting services rendered. Yet, there clearly had been a benefit
accruing to third parties as well. Thus, it is questionable whether such a benefit is
properly classified as merely "'incideotal," as Judge Cardozo suggested. Certainly,
commercial lenders rely on accountants' expert opinions as to the financial soundness of
potential borrowers. They, including the Ultramares plaintiff, would be unable to function effectively without the availability of fiscal verifications. It follows that the very
survival of the commercial credit industry hinges, to a large extent, on the availability of
accurate financial reporting. One observer has concluded:
In fact, to say that the primnary utility derived fi11 , the independent accountant's report and statements rests with third parties, such as suppliers, credit lenders, potential and present investors, and financial analysts is certainly
no great overstatement.

Solomon, Ultra mares Recisited: A N1odertn Studyj of Accountants' Liability to the
PIblic, 18 IE PAUL L. REV. 56, 74 (1968) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
A realistic appraisal, moreover, fosters the conclusion that the plaintiff in Ultramares should not have been viewed as an "incidental" beneficiary of the accountants'
service, but rather as one whose ultimate use was foreseeable and whose needs were
certainly "primary." See Levitin, supira note 4, at 445; Solomon, s upra at 74; Comment,
Accountants' Liabilities to Third Parties Under Commoni Law anid Federal Securities
Law, 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 137, 145 (1967). That the audit was intended for the
use of third party creditors in Ultramares was, in the words of Professor Seavey,
reasonably obvious." Seavey, s1tpi-

at 400. First, the accountants had knowledge that

the certified financial statement would be shown to Stern's creditors and investors; and
second, in order to facilitate Stern's borrowing, the accountants supplied Stern with
thirty-two copies of the certified balance sheet. 255 N.Y. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
Additionally, judge Cardozo's concern with a duty owed to all "indeterminate
class" of potential plaintiffs does not appear to be fully warranted under the facts of
Ultraocares; the limits of the class there could have been easily defined as all the recipients of the thirty-two certified audit copies prepared by the defendant. But Judge Cardozo rejected this proposition in Ultraiares and, in so doing, took an approach appar-
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For over thirty years, Ultramares and its progeny raised the
shield of privity to bar third parties, not standing in a contractual
relationship with accountants, from suing for losses suffered because
of the latter's negligence. There were only three possible avenues
around this privity barrier: an allegation by the plaintiff of fraud on
the part of the defendant; 34 conduct raising an inference of fraud; 35 or
ently inconsistent with Glanzer. See Averill, Attorneyt's Liabilityt to Third Persons for
Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND & VATER L. REX,:. 379, 390-91 (1967). Recall that in
Glanzer, judge Cardozo stated, '[w]e do not need to state the dity in terms of contract
or of privity." 233 N.Y. at 239, 1:35N.E. at 276. Thus, with a (lts grounded in tort, the
parties to whom this duty is owed need not le specifically foreseen. Rather, as Judge
Cardozo himself once noted, the duty is defined in ternis of "[t]he risk reasonably to be
perceived.- Palsgraf v.Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, :344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). Cf.
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968). Unquestionably, the
potential risk of harm to those few parties in direct receipt of the Stern audit was
reasonably foreseeable, and as such, a (lots of care was truly due them, despite the fact
that their actual identity was unknown to the accountants at the tine of the certification.
But Judge Cardozo side-stepped this approach b\ abandoning a tort-based duty
requirement-instead resurrecting the faltering privits doctrine to define the scope of
the

duty owed. See Note,

Potential Lia)ility, of A(coiintants to Third Parties foi

Negligence, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. RE\V. 588, 592 (1967). Another commentator has observed:
The New York court is apparently willing to bury the privity concept in
some cases and adopt different legal theories under which liability can be more
easily rationalized; then, on other occasions, to exhume its remains for purp)oses
of denying recovery . . . .
36 IOWA L. REV. 319. 326 (1951) (footnote omitted).
34 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 53 (2(d Cir.), cert. dellied. 302 U.S. 758

(1937); Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 243-45, 191 N.E. 808, 809-10 (1934).
35 See, eCg., State Street Trost Co. %7.Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (19:38). In
State Street, the New York court of abpeals held that it was reversible error to direct a
verdict for an accountant whose gross negligence was sufficient to support a jury inference of fraud. -[D]eliberate or active fraud" was not a prerequisite to an accountant's

liability to third parties. Id. at 112, 12.3, 15 N.E.2d at 418-19, 424. The court relied on
Ultramnares in reaching the following position:
A representation certified aistrie to the knowledge of the accountants when
knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on
grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief
in its truth, are all sofficient upon which to base liahility. A refisal to see the

obvions, a failire to investigate the doubiltul. if sufficiently gross, mav fiurnish
evidence leading to all inference of fraud so as to impose liability for losses
suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In other words, heedlessness
and reckless disregard of consequence may take the place of' deliberate intention.

id. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 419. It was observed, however, that misjudgment, no matter
how gross, did not constitute fraud. Id. But see Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131
N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd meri., 285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955). In
Duro, the plaintiff-shareholder, agreed to plrchase all the otstanding capital stock from
his sole co-shareholder in reliance on an accountant's audit. 1:31 N.Y.S.2d at 22. \When it

seas discovered that the audit substantially understated the coqoration's deficit, the
plaintiff stied the accountant for damages. Id. at 21-22. The trial court "found that there
[was] not sufficient evidence to warrant a specific finding of fraud.'' Id. at 25. Yet, relying on State Street, the court f'ound for the plaintiff oilthe grounds of a clear finding of
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36
a relationship within which the equivalent of privity could be found.
Surprisingly, the theory of recovery recognized in Glanzer-that
a duty of care is owed to recognized primary beneficiaries of a written
representation whether or not strict privity of contract exists-was
generally not adopted by the pre-1960 courts, 37 even where the facts
were similar to those in Glanzer.38 It was not until the late sixties,
gross negligence. Id. at 25, 27. Such a conclusion seems to be an unwarranted extension
of State Street, a case which did not suggest that liability could be imposed merely on a
finding of gross negligence. Rather, gross negligence was held in State Street only to be
a vehicle to support an inference of fraud. 278 N.Y. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 419. See
Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability-How Far Do We Go?, 36 FORDHAM L.
REV. 191, 204-05 (1967); Note, supra note 33, at 593.
The Supreme Court, in holding that a private cause of action for damages under
section 10b of the Securities Act of 1934 and SEC rule 10b-5 requires scienter, left open
"the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior" will also suffice.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1381 n.12 (1976). The decision in Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973), which would apply l0b-5 to "wxillful
or reckless disregard for the truth," may yet have some viability.
36 See, e.g., C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum); cf. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 111, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418 (1938). In
C.I.T., the Second Circuit approved a jury charge which took the position that
in order to establish a duty to [a non-privity] plaintiff for ordinary negligence in
preparation of... audits, the jury had to find that these reports had been made
for the "primary benefit" of the plaintiff.
224 F.2d at 46. Cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Atherton, 47 N.M. 443, 449, 144 P.2d 157,
161 (194:3).
31 See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 815-16; Levitin, supra note 4, at 447-48.
38 See, e.g., Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.). In Candler, the defendant-accountants were requested to prepare a financial statement for a client and
personally exhibited the statement to a prospective investor. Id. at 166-68. In reliance
on the balance sheet, the plaintiff invested money in the company which, although
appearing financially sound on paper, was near bankruptcy. Id. at 167-68. The court
relied on Ultrainares in dismissing the plaintiff's claim, holding that without a showing
of privity, accountants may not be held liable for theii negligent misrepresentations. Id.
at 196-207.
Lord Denning strongly dissented from the court's adoption of Ultramares and suggested something which approaches the Glanzer analysis, i.e., that accountants be
liable to those persons
to whoom they know their employer is going to show the accounts, so as to
induce him to invest money or take some other action on them.
Id. at 180-81; see id. at 18.3-84; Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent
M1isrepreseitation byI Accountants, 67 L.(,). REV. 466 (1951). Professor Seavey observed
that, as had been the plaintiff in Glanizer, the Candler plaintiff was a foreseeable reliant
and therefore the Gla nzer rationale should have been applied. Id. at 478. The House of
Lords, appairently responding to Lord Denning, recognized in Hedley, Bynse Co. v.
Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, that a duty of care exists

where a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his judgmeit or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry [and] such person
takes it upon hiiself to give informsation or advice to, or allows his information
oi advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows, or should know,
will place reliance upon it ....
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when public accountants became the objects of increased litigation, 39
that courts explicitly applied the Glanzer rationale to impose liability
on accountants for ordinary negligence in the preparation of financial
40
statements relied on by third parties.
A non-privity plaintiff was first permitted to maintain an action
against an accountant for ordinary negligence in Rusch Factors, Inc.
v. Levin. 4 1 Relying on the defendant-accountant's financial statements, the plaintiff loaned the defendant's client more than one third
of a million dollars. When the debtor went into receivership, the
plaintiff sued the accountant for damages, alleging alternatively
fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. The defendant moved to
dismiss the action, one ground being a lack of privity. 4 2 While acknowledging that "[n]o appellate court, English or American has . . .
held an accountant liable in negligence to reliant parties not in privity," the court challenged the "social utility rationale" of Ultramares. 43 Furthermore, the Rusch court saw the "innocent reliant
party" to be less capable of bearing a loss engendered by an
accountant's negligence than the accountant himself who could insure
his losses distributing premium costs to his clients. 44 The court obId. at 514. Thus, the continued vitality of the Ultra(ares rationale in England is suspect.
39 See note 2 supra. See also Note, supra note 33, at 596-97.
40
See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91-93 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan
v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401-03 (Iowa 1969). But see Canaveral Capital Corp. v.
Bruce, 214 So.2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Investment Col). v. Buchman, 208
So.2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Buchman has been noted in 23 MIAm i L. REv. 256
(1968).
41 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
42 Id. at 86-87.
43 Id. at 90-91. The Rusch court felt that Ultramares had been significantly undermined by Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), a case decided one year
earlier. 284 F. Supp. at 91. In Kletz, a federal district court had sustained a common law
cause of action for deceit against an accounting firm in favor of third-party investors for
their failure to disclose after-acquired information which, if revealed, would have shown
an already widely distributed financial statement to be materially incorrect. 266 F. Supp.
at 182-83, 186.
The court apparently disregarded any privity requirement and simply concluded:
The elements of "good faith and common honesty" which govern the businessman presumably should also apply to the statutory "independent public
accountant".
Id. at 186. See also Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368, 37.3-74 (2d Cir. 1893) (where the seller
of a business discovers recent business declines and has made favorable statements
regarding the business operations, "good faith and common honesty require him to correct the misapprehension which he has created"). For extensive discussions of the Kletz
case see Katsoris, supra note 35, at 206-08; Comment, supra note 33, at 149-52; Note,
Accountants' Liability for Nondisclosure of After-Acquired Information: Strict Liability Under Rule 1Ob-5?, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 554 (1968).
14 284 F. Supp. at 91. In advocating the applical)ility of an enterprise liability ap-
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served that "[h]ere the plaintiff is a single party whose reliance was
actually foreseen by the defendant." As such, the court stated that
"the case at bar is qualitatively distinguishable from Ultramnares,"
and
governed by Glanzer.45 Denying the defendant's motion to dismiss,
the court held
that an accountant should be liable in negligence for careless finan-

cial misrepresentations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited
classes of persons.

46

Rusch marked the first extension of accountants' liability for negligence to third parties not in privity of contract. Because in so holding, the Rusch court found legal precedent--Glanzer-upon which to
base its conclusions, perhaps the true significance of the case lies in
the fact that it represents the first judicial challenge of the blanket
Cardozo immunization of accountants from liability to "an indetermi-

nate class" for an "indeterminate time. '47 The court clearly was troubled by its implied repudiation of Ultrainares, taking great pains to
rationalize the results on the strength of the Glanzer "primary beneficiary" analysis. But the court went far beyond Glanzer when it
announced that it would sustain a cause of action in favor not only of

proach to accountants' third party liability, the court asked rhetorically:
Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it o
the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk
onto its customers, wvho can in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming
public?
Id.
For a discussion of the present-day status of accountant's professional liability insurance see notes 114-25 infra and accompanying text.
5 284 F. Supp. at 91. The Rusch court criticized the result reached in Investment
Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) as "wrong in so far as it
failed either to perceive or to give weight to the distinction between Ultramares and
GlaCzer." 284 F. Supp. at 92.
The court also note(] that the Glazer principle, upon which it relied, had been
made applicable to accountants through the tentative drafts of section 552 of the Restotement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 91. This section, which proposes the rule of law of
negligent misrepresentation, states that a representer would be liable to
the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to
supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends to supply it ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) (all capitalized in
original). For a further discussion of the Restatement position see notes 75-79 infra and
accompanying text.
46 284 F. Supp. at 93.
47Id. at 90-91.
In Hocifelder, the Rusch approach seems to have been accepted in dictuim by both
the Seventh Circuit, see 503 F.2d at 1107, and the Supreme Court, see 96 S.Ct. at 1380
11.9.
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specifically foreseen third parties but also of unknown members of
48
specifically "foreseen and limited classes."
One year after the decision in Rusch, a specifically foreseeable
reliant party was allowed to recover damages by the Iowa supreme
court in Ryan v. Kanne.4 9 The successor corporation of the client
sued for losses incurred following its use of an allegedly negligently
prepared financial statement. 50 The court held that since the accountants were made aware of both the purpose of the financial statement
51
and the actual party to whom the statement was to be exhibited,
"the lack of privity should be no valid defense to a claim for damages
due to the accountant's negligence. "52 Thus, a departure from the
"strict rule" of Ultrarnareswas again warranted, now on the authority
53
of both Glanzer and Rusch.
The resurrection of the Glanzer approach continued as other
courts subsequently held that accountants could be liable to foreseen
reliant third parties. 54 Nevertheless, none of the courts which
stepped away from the pre-1960 mechanical application of Ultramares
was compelled to forge new law. In each case, the injured party was
specifically known by the accountant to be the intended user of the
audit. The party was, in short, the "primary beneficiary" contemplated by Glanzer.
The recent movement away from Ultrainares has not, however,
found unanimity among the courts. For example, although the Tenth

48 284 F. Supp. at 93. Whether the court was satisfied with restricting liability to
limited foreseen classes is questionable in light of its concluding language that
[t]he Court does not rule upon, but leaves open for reconsideration in the light
of trial development, the question of whether an accountant's liability for negligent misrepresentation ought to extend to the flll limits of foreseeability.
hi.
49 170 N.W. 2d 395, 401-03 (Iowa 1969).
50 Id. at 396-99.
51 Id. at 398-400.

52](1. at 401.
5

3 Id. at 401-03. The court concluded that accountants should be subjected to liabil-

itv'

for negligence to persons for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows
the information is intended, especially when the party to be benefited is identified before the statement or report is submitted by the accountant.
Id. at 403 (emphasis in original).
54 See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs,
455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972); Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058, 1061--63
(D.N.D. 1974) (dictumn); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378,
381-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876-80
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971). Cf. Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974).
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Circuit, in Stephens Industries, Inc. v. Haskins & Sells,5 5 recognized
Rusch and its progeny as representing a "developing trend," it refused to depart from the "generally accepted rule" established in
Ultramares, and denied recovery even in the case of a specifically
56
foreseen third party.
In Milliner v. Elner Fox & Co.,57 the Utah supreme court similarly rejected an invitation to expand accountants' liability to the
limits of foreseeability contemplated by the Rusch dictum. The plaintiff had purchased publicly held stock in reliance upon defendant's
allegedly negligently prepared statement. When the shares became
worthless, plaintiff sued. 58 Although the court rejected the Ultramares rule in favor of what it regarded as the better approach of
Rusch, plaintiff's claim was dismissed because he could not bring
himself within the Rusch-Glanzer class of protected "primary beneficiaries." Furthermore, the court was not willing to hold the accountants responsible to contemplated, but not specifically foreseen,
59
reliant third parties.
The persistent vitality of Ultramares has waned, however, and its
underlying rationale permanently scarred. Nevertheless, there is
presently no common law precedent, save the dictum in Rusch and
Ryan, for extending accountants' liability beyond a limited, specifically foreseen class of third party reliants.
55438

F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971).

Id. at 359-60. Since Stephestis was a diversity action, a burden was imposed upon
the plaintiff-appellant to prove that the district court erred in refusing to find that the
Colorado state courts would have adopted the Rn sch standard. Id. at 359-60. The court
concluded that the appellant's proofs did not sustain this burden of establishi g "clea,
error." Id. at 360. Therefore, the strict U/trim(ares rule-no "duty owed to non-privy
third parties"-was sustained. Id. at :359-60. See also MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga.
App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973).
No reported decisio in New Jersey addresses the question of the liability of' accountants to third parties hOr negligence. In an unreported opinion, however, the appellate division iii 1974 affironed the dismissal o ' a third-party action against an accounting
firi because the plaintiff' could ito t prove that the\, had actually relied on the financial
statement in question, thus avoiding consideration of the role of' privity in such a suit.
See Modell v. Wellington Colnpiiter Graphics, Inc., No. A-1416-72 (N.J. Super. Ct.,
App. Div., Nov. 21, 1974).
New Jersey has not yet extended liability for negligent misrel)resentation to third
parties for economic loss, see Kahl v. Love, :37 N.J.L. 5, 8-9 (Sup. Ct. 1874), but liability
has been fouid for such negligence where physical injury is involved, see Pabon v.
Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 497-98, 164 A.2d 773, 784 (App. Div.
1960).
5

57 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
Id. at 807.

.5

IId. at 808. The court q uestioned the "f'oreseeability" of potential stock purchasers. Id. For a discussion of this aspect of the case see note 79 infra.
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ALTERNATIVES TO PRIVITY

The lack of privity of contract has never presented a major barrier to recovery for losses resulting from the negligent performance of
services by professionals who have a special responsibility to the public stemming from a duty of public disclosure. 6 ° When this duty is
present, liability has been extended to any member of the "class of
persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them."'" For example, food
inspectors and recording clerks, among others, have been subjected
to liability on the basis of their duty to the public. 6 2 Liability to those
not in privity has, however, been extended to persons without a duty
of public disclosure.
The Biakanja Test
In Biakanja v. Irving,63 the California supreme court held a notary public, who was wrongfully engaged in the practice of law, liable
for the negligent preparation of a will which had been denied probate. The plaintiff, the sole intended beneficiary under the will, recovered on a negligence theory despite her lack of contractual privity
with the notary. 6 4 The Biakanja court expressly rejected the concept
of privity as applied to negligence actions and held that liability
should instead be determined on a case-by-case basis with the court
weighing several factors, including
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
60 See PROSSER, supra note 15, § 107, at 709 & nn.62-65. Dean Prosser points out
that those services which are of a public nature are often governed by statutory provisions defining liability. Id.
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(3) (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) (all capitalized in original). Comment k to this section indicates that as well as applying to public officials, "it may [also] apply to private individuals or corporations who are required
by law to file information for the benefit of the public." Id., Explanatory Notes, Comment k at 28. Quaere: Would the reporting requirements of section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 sustain a finding of liability under this section for an accountant's failure to
comply with the statutory reporting standards? Responsibilities arising under the federal securities laws have been found to give rise to common law actions. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503-04, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85-86
(1969).
62 See PROSSER, supra note 15, § 107, at 709 nn.62-65.
63 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
- Id. at 648, 650-51, 320 P.2d at 17, 19.
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blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of pre65
venting future harm.

This balancing test has been utilized, particularly in California, to
thrust liability upon attorneys and other professionals not in privity
with the injured party. The first case to reject privity and employ the
Biakanja test was Lucas v. Harnm.6 6 In Lucas, the court held that an
attorney could be liable to an intended beneficiary for a negligently
drafted will, although under the specific facts no negligence was
found. 67 In reaching this result, in the absence of the moral blame
factor present in Biakanja, the Lucas court applied the Ultramares
test-whether or not the imposition of liability to intended beneficiaries "would impose an undue burden on the profession"-but
reached the opposite conclusion. 68 The Lucas court was not dismayed
by the prospect of liability to an "indeterminate class" in an "indeterminate amount" because, "[a]lthough in some situations liability
could be large and unpredictable in amount, this is also true of an
attorney's liability to his client."-69 A converse ruling would thrust the
70
entire burden of the loss upon the "innocent beneficiary.
Privity as a relevant concept has also been abandoned in recent
third party actions against design professionals-architects and engi6.1Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
66 56 Cal. 2(1 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). Several law reviews have
noted the Lucas decision. See, e.g., 75 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1962); 16 RUTGERS L. REV.
475 (1962); 14 STAN. L. REv. 580 (1962).
67 56 Cal. 2(1 at 588-89, 592-93, 364 P.2d at 687-88, 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 82,-24,
826.
681d. at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
69 1(d.
7o Id. The consideration of who should hear the risk of loss suggests a policy of risk
allocation, which is equally as applicable to the accounting profession. A creditor relying on an audit can also he said to he "innocent," and it is equally doubtful whether he
should hear the risk of loss for another's negligence.
Later California cases found negligence and imposed liability upon attorneys in
favor of non-client, third parties. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161,
74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 771, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Ct.
App. 1971).
\Vhile many states have not yet recognized the liability of attorneys to third parties,
a Connecticut court has expressly recognized the Biakanja-Lucas test. See Licata v.
Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 38,3--84, 225 A.2d 28, 31 (C.P. Windham County 1966).
The Licata court held that privity would not bar a l)eneficiary under a will from bringing an action against an attorney for negligentl]\ failing to provide for the requisite
numher of witnesses to the will. Id. at 379-83, 225 A.2d at 29-31. Other states have
recognized, at least hy implication, that privity is not necessarily a harrier to negligence
suits against attorneys. See, e.g., W.L. Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63
S.W.2d 841 (1933); Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P. 265 (1930). But see
Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc.2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct, 1973); Maneri v.
Ainodeo, 38 \lisc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1963).
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neers. 7 1 Liability to persons physically injured as a result of negligent
structural design has been viewed within the ambit of traditional
foreseeability-proximate causation tort principles. 72 Design professionals have been held liable for economic damages to surety companies not in privity, but these actions have generally presented situations where only one potential plaintiff existed. 73
The cases involving other professions have usually presented
situations in which the specific plaintiff suffering damage was foreseeable, but the increasing use of the Biakanja test may have consequences in terms of liability expansion. In any event, the Biakanja
rationale certainly permits a court to impose liability on professionals
who negligently convey information to a member of a class that they
know or have reason to know would rely upon the information. 74
The Purpose-OrientedTest of the Restatement
Once the requirement of privity is abandoned, the distinction
between an actually foreseen and a reasonably foreseeable class of
reliants has enormous implications for professionals in terms of the
scope of their ultimate potential liability. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts, in a tentative draft, would apparently extend liability only to
a member of an actually foreseen class, 75 as distinguished from a specifically foreseen plaintiff. Section 552 provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
71 See, e.g., Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963); A.R. Mover, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1973); Laukkanen v.
Jewel Tea Co., 78 I11.App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966), cert. denied, 78 I11. App. 2d
114 (1969).
72 See Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Il1. App. 2d 153, 161-62, 222 N.E.2d
584,
588-89 (1966), cert. denied, 78 I11. App. 2d 114 (1969).
73 See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968)
(lack of privity held not to bar recovery of economic damages from architect by surety
company); Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967) (lack of privity does not bar
indemnitor of surety from suing architect). The court in \Westerhold, utilizing a
Biakana-tvpe balancing test, had little difficulty imposing liability because "'[t]he potential liability [was] strictly limited as to the total amount and one known claimant
which was not in privity.'" Id. at 79.
74 Although the language of Biakanja would permit a finding of more expansive
liability, the court in Biakaoja adopted the "end and aim" analysis of Glanzer. 49 Cal.
2d at 647, 320 P.2d at 19. See M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 198
Cal. App. 2cd 305, 308-09, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966);
Comment, supra note 3, at 147-49. But even the Reporter, Dean Prosser, professed
when submitting the draft to being "not entirely happy with it, and hope[d] that it
[could] be improved." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes, § 552,
at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
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supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to

them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in

Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information, or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it: and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends
the information to influence, or knows that the recipient so
intends, or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the

information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons
for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in
76
which it is intended to protect them.

The Restatement position regarding liability to parties not in contractual privity-subsection (2)(a)--is not limited to a specifically foreseen plaintiff. This section, which limits liability to "the person or
one of the persons" clearly must include a plaintiff who is a member
of a class to which the conveyor of the information intends the information be supplied. 77 The liability of the provider of information is
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) (emphasis
added) (all capitalized in original).
The 1938 version of section 552 was much broader in scope because it extended
liability to "the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Towrs § 552(b)(i) (1938). Thus, liab-ity would effectively have extended to any foreseeable class of persons. See Bradley,
Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 J. Bus. L. 190, 192; Katsoris, supra
note 35, at 198. The section was revised, however, to bring it in line with case law.
See id.
77 RESTATEMENT (SECO)ND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552, comment h at 23
(Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966), provides in part:
Under this Section . . . it is not necessary that the maker should have any
particular person in mind as the intended, or even the probable recipient of the
information ....
It is sufficient, in other words, that the maker knows that the
information is intended for repetition to a certain group or class of persons, and
that the plaintiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker never had
heard of him when the information was given.
(Emphasis added.) See also Fiflis, supra note 1, at 108; Comment, supra note 3, at 147.
One court has inter)reted this comment as suggesting "that liability is to be limited
to persons dealing with the employer of the supplier of the information." Anderson v.
Boone County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123, 129 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1967). In that case,
recovery for negligent preparation of a title abstract was denied to a person who purchased from the original seller for whom the abstract was prepared. Id. at 124, 126. See
also Hawkins v. Oakland Title hns. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 128-29, 331 P.2d
742, 749 (1958).
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defined by the nature of the transaction in which the prospective
plaintiff has received the information in that it must be the same
transaction or one substantially similar to the transaction that it was
intended to or known to be intended to influence.
While the Restatement supports liability to members of an actually foreseen class, it does not go so far as to allow recovery where
the reliance by the injured party is merely "foreseeable." 78 Thus, the
minimum standard is that the conveyor of information at least actually
know that the recipient intends to supply it to a particular person or
class of persons before liability for negligent misrepresentation can
ensue. This requirement of scienter is more than foreseeability but
less than personal intent. Herein lies the difficulty in drafting a rule;
something more than foreseeability is necessary, but exactly how
much more is difficult to articulate. 79
The Reporter noted:
It is not enough that it is "foreseeable" that the information will reach third
persons. In one sense it is always "foreseeahle" that any information will he
communicated to others.
78

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552, at 15 (Tent. Draft No. 12,

1966).
The District of Columbia Circuit recognized the limitations which must be placed
on foreseeability in a suit brought by Ralph Nader and an organization before which he
was scheduled to speak against Allegheny Airlines for fraudulent misrepresentation
which resulted in dishonoring Nader's confirmed reservation because the flight had
been overbooked. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 548-49 (D.C. Cir.
1975), ret'd on other grounds and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 1978 (1976). The court found
that Nader could bring the suit because "he was within an identifiable class of third
persons-potential passengers-that Allegheny intended to influence," but dismissed
the action brought by the organization because the airline "had no special reason to
know of [its] reliance or even of its existence." 512 F.2d at 548-49.
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552, at 16 (Tent. Draft

No. 12, 1966). See Rozny v. Marnul, 43 ll. 2d 54, 66-67, 250 N.E.2d 656, 663 (1969). It
would appear, however, that there is no limit to the size of the class of actually foreseen
reliants:
What if an art expert certifies a painting as a genuine Vermeer, knowing that
the dealer to whom he gives the certificate intends to publish it in a bulletin to
be sent to 1,000 prospective purchasers in the hope of making the sale. Is he
liable for negligence to the man who buys? The Reporter would say yes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552, at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 12,
1966).
This question is causing confusion as evidenced by the holding in Rusch that liability should only extend to "actually foreseen and limited classes of persons." 284 F.
Supp. at 93 (emphasis added). No guidance is offered as to what might constitute a
limited class. In the hypothetical offered by the Reporter to the Restatement probably
only one person will eventually suffer harm. The court in Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co.,
529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) apparently looked to numerical certainty when it determined
that
[a] future purchaser of shares of stock of a corporation . . .belongs to an unlimited class of equity holders who could not be reasonably foreseen as a third

1976]

LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS

TO THIRD PARTIES

527

It seems evident that imposition of liability to all parties who
"foreseeably" rely can effectuate unjust results if taken to the extreme. The purpose-oriented analysis of the Restatement is deceptive,
however. Although the "purpose" of a particular audit, for example,
80
may be relevant as to foreseeability, it should not be determinative.
To make purpose determinative is to ignore business realities, particularly when liability for a negligently performed certified audit is at
issue. The "purpose" of the preparation of a certified audit may be
specific, i.e., only for creditors, but is more often "general," i.e., "for
the use of government agencies, investors, creditors, unions, and
other interested parties." 81
To follow the Restatement strictly would be to allow accountants
to escape liability when performing a "general purpose" audit if they
could show that they had no specific knowledge of the audited
company's intention to show the audit to a member of a particular
class. This is illogical, considering that the same standards of care
must be observed regardless of the identity of the actual recipient.
The limitations imposed by the tentative draft of the Restatement
were clearly intended to accommodate the "pragmatic" objection
voiced in Ultramares. The Restatement is thus a compromise position,8 2 which many courts have had little difficulty accepting. 83 But
party who would be expected to rely on a financial statement prepared by an
accountant for the corporation.
Id.at 808.
The problem of a large class of potential plaintiffs with a consequent potential for
extensive cumulative liability is what haunted Judge Cardozo and even recent courts.
The tear is not insubstantial, b~ut there are certain factors which, when dealing with a
common law action for negligent misrepresentation, will minimize this "numerical"
threat. First, each plaintiff must plead and prove reliance, negligence, and proximate
causation, a difficult task which will significantly limit the number of successful plaintiffs. Frivolous actions might thus be easily eliminated on motions for summary judgment. Second, the need to show specific, individual reliance would probably preclude
the finding of predominant common questions of fact, thereby minimizing the likelihood of a devastating class action. And furthermore, ifbrought in a federal court as a
diversity action, the recent decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974), which held that persons bringing a class action must notify, at their own expense, all class members, would tend to discourage many such actions against accountants.
80 The relevant element of the Biakanja test is the question of "the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff." 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
8i Stern, Accountants' Liability
1 to Third Parties, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 490, 493
(1968) (footnote omitted).
82See Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058, 1063 (D.N.D. 1974).
m See, e.g., Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill.
2d 54, 66, 250 N.E.2d 656, 662 (1969) (surveyor
defendant liable to third party because, inter alia, defendant knew of third party reliance); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 402-03 (Iowa 1969) (accountants liable to "limited class" of third party reliants who were "actually foreseen"); Tartera v. Palumbo, 453
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the empirical basis for the fear that accountants will be forced out of
business is subject to challenge in light of modem insurance techniques.8 4 Furthermore, the stringency of the Restatement approach
may be as arbitrary in application as was the privity doctrine. It prevents a court from weighing all the factors before it in determining
whether the extension of liability to a particular plaintiff is advisable.
A Balancing Approach to Accountant's Duty
The inequities of the Ultrarnares and Restatenent approaches
may be avoided by considering a balancing test for the finding of a
duty. The flexibility of a balancing approach is particularly appropriate to any determination of liability for negligence because of its
capacity to permit a court to respond to evolving social mores and
business practices. Professors Harper and James have encouraged the
use of a balancing test for generally ascertaining the duty of care
owed to third parties for negligent misrepresentation. 8 5 The Biakanja
court relied upon the Harper and James analysis in formulating its
balancing test.8 6 Professor Fiflis has specifically advocated the adoption of a Biakanja-tvpe balancing test for the determination of the
third party liability of accountants. 8 7 He argued that
S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tenn. 1970) (surveyor may be liable to specifically foreseen third party
for damages resulting from negligently performed boundary survey).
84 See notes 118-25 infra and accompanying text.
8,5 2 F. HARPER & F. JAIES, LAWV OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1052 (1956). They argued that
in determining whether a dut, is 6wed to those parties with whom there is no contract
[t]he ultimate question is whether such a (uty should be imposed as a
matter of policy. This in turn will depend on the balancing of several factors,
namely, the burden it would put on defendant's activity; the extent to which
the risk is one normally incident to that activity; the risk and the burden to
plaintiff; the respective availability and cost of insurance to the two parties; the
prevalence of insurance in fact; the desirability and effectiveness of putting the
pressure to insure on one rather than the other, and the like. A judicious regard
for such realistic considerations might justify liability in some situations and not
in others even where there is no basis in doctrine for such a distinction.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. 378. 380-82. 225 A.2d 28,
29-30 (C.P. Windham County 1966).
86 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
87 Fiflis, supra note 1, at 109. Professor Fiflis attacks the actually foreseen plaintiff
approach which "would leave no room for the very real consideration in a case involving auditors because of the" possibility that a finding of liability may be too burdensome. 1d. at 110. His desire in adopting such a test is apparently to allow courts to be
more restrictive than the Restatement. He illustrated the need for flexibility:
In one case the audit may be of a closely held company for use in making a
new public offering, or in another case, for reporting to the existing manageinent. One Would not be offended in the former case with a finding of liability
to the investors despite the absence of privity, whereas in the second case imposition of liability for loss in an unintended transaction would be unthinkable.

1976]

LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS

TO THIRD PARTIES

529

the merit of the balancing process is that it permits the court to
weigh any pertinent considerations as they appear more or less
relevant in each case, including changing public policy."8

Within the framework of rule 10b-5, Professor Fiflis noted that
privity of contract as a viable doctrine in securities act litigation has
virtually disappeared. 8 9 Rather than pertaining to the existence of a
duty, privity has become a factor of secondary importance which may
or may not be considered by a court at a later stage of a proceeding
for purposes of determining the strengths or weaknesses of the primary elements of 10b-5 liability. 90
Such an approach to the role of privity is illustrated in Brown v.
Bullock, 9' a non-10b-5 case, where the court nevertheless addressed
itself to the rule's application vis-h-vis private remedies:
[P]rivity is not an ultimate or operative fact. It is an evidentiary fact
to be considered in conjunction with other material facts in determining whether the relationship . . .between the plaintiffs and the
defendants and the nature of the particular acts and transactions
92
involve the duty created by the statute.

Courts subsequent to Brown have looked to the above language for
the proposition that the relationship between privity and rule 10b-5
\Vhether or not the imposition of liability would be "unthinkable" would depend to
a large extent on the' representations made in the audit and the nature of the disclaimers, if any. It is hard to believe, however, given present business practices, that an
accountant would not expect the corporation to show a certified audit to third parties.
88 Id. at 110 (emphasis in original).
1 . at 110-i.
'0See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760-61 (.5th Cir. 1974); Cochran v.
Chaming Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Rule 10hb-5 requires a causal nexus; the injury complained of must have arisen "in
conection with the purchase or sale of any securits .'"17 C.F.R. § 240.10b--5(c) (1974).
From this language courts have determined that some relationship between private
10b-5 litigants must exist. See, e.g., In re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F.
Supp. 366, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). ILitially, the class of potential plaintiffs was limited,
for this "connection" between the proscribed conduct and the injury suffered was
deemed satisfied onl\ if' at least a modicum of* contractual privity between the parties
could be shown. See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp.
701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) ("semblance of privity"
required).
The Farusiorth directive has, however, been given little more than lip service.
The general rule that has emerged is that the failure by a private 106--5 plaintiff to
allege privity, in the form "of
a contemporaneous market trading or even a purchase or
sale by a purported l0b-5 violator, will not be fatal to the complaint. See Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
9' 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
921 d. at 230.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 507

must assume a non-absolute perspective, thereby becoming merely
an inconclusive consideration in the determination of whether a
statutory duty of care was owed to the plaintiff. 93
In Brown, the court stated that in determining the existence of
such a duty under 10b-5 there should be considered
[t]he relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants,
the nature of the defendants' participation in the challenged transactions, and the plaintiffs' reliance upon the defendants' acts . . .94
Professor Fiflis noted that such an approach is strikingly similar to the
highly fact-oriented analysis employed in Biakanja.95 The balancing
approach embodied in Biakanja has been applied by at least one
court to find accountants liable to third parties for negligent misrepresentations.
In Aluma Kraft Manufacturing Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co. ,96 the
court rejected the doctrine of privity and announced that the following factors must be considered in determining whether or not liability should extend to a particular third-party plaintiff.
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; and (4) the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
97
suffered.

The court found that the facts as alleged satisfied this test, and incorporated the Glanzer-Restatenent view so that a showing that the defendant knew that the plaintiff would be relying on the financial
statement satisfied the first element of the balancing test.9 8
93 See, e.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37-38 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
94 194 F. Supp. at 230.
9 Fiflis, supra note 1, at 111. Professor Fiflis observed:
This system under Rule 10b--5, considering the whole mosaic of the relationship of the parties, the degree of culpability of the defendant, whether the
defendant profited, and the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant, is nothing less
than the same sort of consideration used in the California balancing process.
id.
, 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). The plaintiff was an investor of an audited
company who, relying on the audited financial statement, eventually bought one
hundred percent of the shares in the company at an inflated price because of a negligent overvaluation of the assets. Id. at 379-80.
97 Id. at 383. The court relied on the balancing test used in Westerhold v. Carroll,
419 S.W.2d 73, 81 (Mo. 1967), which had adopted the Biakanja test. 493 S.W.2d at 183.
98 See 493 S.W.2d at 382-83. One commentator has criticized the Aluma Kraft
court's reliance on Glanzer:
[Bly analyzing the econdmic injury cases through contract terms and concepts

1976]

LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS TO THIRD PARTIES

531

Although Professor Fiflis, and to some extent the court in Aluna
Kraft, may have been concerned with the ability of a court to limit
liability, a balancing approach may also permit expansion of liability
where evolving business practices mandate an expansive view of duty.
ANALYSIS OF THE BALANCING APPROACH

The function of the balancing approach is, of course, to determine whether or not a legal duty is owed by a defendant to a particular plaintiff. Without such duty no liability can be imposed. Although
the question of duty is ultimately determined on a case-by-case basis,
there are certain general policy considerations relevant to the accounting profession which are significant in any determination of
duty.
The Accountant's Professional Role As "Relationship"
The role of the accountant in the normal functioning of business
has been expanding significantly since 1931 when Judge Cardozo was
able to declare that public accountants were only "public" to the extent that they held themselves out to the public for hire but in no
sense owed a duty to the public. 99 Whereas at one time an audit was
performed primarily for the purpose of informing management of possible defalcations and irregularities in its business, 10 0 the reality now
is that
the principal effect of the auditor's opinion to management is to
meet the requirements of, and influence the actions of, third parties with whom the auditor has no contract. 101

rather than negligence theory, the court perpetuates an arbitrary, though more
constricted, perimeter of immunity, leaving the plaintiff less able to submit his
case to a jury than in personal injury cases.
39 Mo.L. REV. 466, 472 (1974).
99255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
It has been argued that accountants are in a fiduciary relationship with third parties
whose reliance the accountants might reasonably foresee and thus owe them a high duty
of care. See Stern, supra note 81, at 493-94. Vhile the spirit of this contention is commendable, the analogy is unacceptable: fiduciary relationships are direct relationships.
100 Comment, Auditors' Responsibility!for Mlisrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of FinancialStatements, 44 VASH. L. REV. 139, 178 (1968).
The author explained that "as the ownership and management of business separated, it became necessary for corporate owners to review the performance of corporate
managers." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Fiflis, supra note 1, at 106; Meek, Liability
1
of the Accountant to Parties Other than His Employer, 1942 'Wis. L. REV. 371.
101 Comment, supra note 100, at 178. When many copies of an audited financial
statement are supplied by the accountanit to the client at the client's request, "as a
practical matter, the accountant knows that third parties .. .will rely upon the audit."
Carroll, Aeeountant's Third Party Liability, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. 252, 254 (1966).
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The accounting profession itself has long recognized the
02
accountant's duty of impartiality and independence from the client. 1
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
stresses the accountant's responsibility to the public in its Code of
ProfessionalEthics. 10 3 The federal securities laws, recognizing this responsibility, impose certain duties on accountants in their participation in securities transactions. 10 4 Many state statutes, while not specifically imposing liability to third parties on accountants for violations,
do at least recognize the importance of the accountant's function to
05
the public and attempt to regulate the profession.1
The nature of the certified audit also argues for the imposition of
a duty to persons other than the client, for the responsibilities of the
auditor in certifying a financial statement do not change with the intended recipient. 0 61f some accountants are fearful of reporting or un102

See AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Rule 1.01, at 2 (1970); Fiflis, supra

note 1, at 45-52. Independence is of particular importance when the accountant is performing an "independent audit." AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Opinion No.
12, at 2.3-24 (1970).
103 In its introduction to the Code of Professional Fthics, the AICPA has declared:
The reliance of the public and the business community on sound financial
reporting and advice on business affairs imposes on the accounting profession
an obligation to maintain high standards of technical competence, morality and
integrity.
AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1 (1970).
104 Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), imposes liability
on accountants to third parties for misstatements of material facts in financial reports
used in connection with a registration statement, where the accountant has failed to
exercise due diligence. See, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Section 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(1 (1970), and section 10b of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), may also permit the imposition
of liability on accountants for various fraudulent activities. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 126-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (10b-5
liability imposed for misleading statements in financial report and audited statements
distributed to investors for private placement); Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F.
Supp. 94, 104-05 (N.D. I11. 1967) (10b-5 liability imposed for accountants' failure to disclose management's falsifications of financial status which would have been discovered
had GAAP been followed).
105 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5000 et seq. (West 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:2A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7400 et seq. (McKinney 1972);

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 9.1 et seq. (1968), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.2 et

seq. (Supp. 1975-76).
106 The scope of a specific audit may be determined by many variables such as the
purpose of the particular engagement as ,vell as the nature of the business and industry
being audited. See Fiflis, supra note 1, at 36. Obviously these variables will affect or
relate to the foreseeability of a particular class of plaintiffs, but the accountant must still
comply with the standards of the profession regardless of who actually receives the
audit. Thus, when there is deviation from these standards, the question is not whether a
negligent misrepresentation was made, but rather whether the accountant should be
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covering information which is not favorable to management,1" 7 they
are clearly violating their professional responsibility and should not be
protected by the courts. As one commentator has noted:
[I]t becomes a highly questionable practice to allow a profession to
be employed and gain the benefits of a position of trust, without
insisting it assume the responsibilities which accompany that
position. 108

Thus, insofar as the existence of a "relationship" is requisite to
the existence of a duty, it may be found generally in the role and
responsibility of the accounting profession vis-l-vis the public. The
artificial and absolute barrier of privity arose for reasons of policy.
Those considerations, as they now apply to accountants, must be
reexamined in light of modern social realities.
Social Utility Analysis
In suits for negligence courts often examine the social utility of a
defendant's action in order to determine whether its value to society
far outweighs the risk of harm.1 0 9 This process involves the consideration of several factors.
One factor to be considered is the burden on the defendant to
avoid resulting harm. In view of the fact that there is already a duty
imposed on the defendant-accountant to avoid harm to the client,
extension of liability for negligence to third parties does not significantly increase the accountant's task. By adhering generally to the
standards of the profession, an accountant will minimize the risk of
loss to any possible plaintiff

The burden and consequences to the plaintiff must also be
examined. 110 The onerousness of the burden on the plaintiff to avoid
liable to this plaintiff for the negligence. See notes 137-143 infra and accompanying
text.
107 Several commentators have suggested that the extension of liability for negligent
misrepresentation to third parties would tend to force the profession to formulate and
strictly adhere to high professional standards for the auditing function. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 33, at 149; Note, supra note 4, at 606; Note, supra note 15, at 163.
Experience under the securities laws may support this argument. It has been noted
that although section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 would seemingly open accountants
to numerous suits, few suits have been brought, in part because "the accounting profession prepares registration statements more carefully than their other certifications."
Frye, Extending Accountants' Professional Liability, 14 NAT'L PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT,
Feb. 1969, at 12, 14.
ios Note, supra note 15, at 163.
i09 See PROSSEB, stra note 17, § 3 1,at 148.
110 See Schwartz v.Helms Bakery, Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 242, 430 P.2d 68, 72, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 510, 517 (1967).
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injury results from the usual lack of access to the information used by
the accountant and the inability to analyze it-precisely the role assumed by the accountant. The consequences of the accountant's failure to adhere at least to professional standards may be devastating to
the plaintiffs. The combination of the plaintiff's burden and potentially great loss in comparison to the minimal burden placed on the
accountant serves to demonstrate prima facie the social disutility of
insulating accountants from third party liability.
While courts have often protected new industries engaging in
high risk-high benefit activities from burdensome liability in order to
encourage future participation,"' this aspect of the social utility
analysis is inapplicable to accountants' third party liability. The accounting profession is neither new nor are its services inherently
dangerous, and liability can be avoided by following the accepted
standards of what is now a mature, highly skilled profession.
While it is no longer necessary to protect the activities of accountants because of the inherent nature of their services, the fact remains
that because of the extensive use of certified financial statements, the
potential for burdensome liability exists. The question therefore
arises: Can the accounting profession insure itself against such liability?
The Viability of the PragmaticObjection
The most widely cited reason for the longevity of Ultramares is
its policy determination that the accounting profession would never
1 12
survive the imposition of liability for negligence to third parties.
Professor Fleming James has suggested that a determination of the
insurability of the loss is an important aspect of any evaluation of the
validity of the "pragmatic objection." 113 It seems that many of the
apprehensions which have been expressed over the years concerning
114
the availability and cost of insurance may have been overstated.
111 See PROSSER, so pra note 15, § 4, at 22-23.
112See Katsoris, stupra note 35, at 199; Meek, su pra note 100, at 389; Comment,

supra note 100, at 180.
113 James, supra note 19, at 51.
114 Proponents of an expansion of liability have maintained that the financial burden
of higher insurance premiums may be largely mitigated by the accounting profession's
ability to pass on the cost of increased rates to their clients in the form of higher fees.
This "enterprise liability" approach suggests that the ultimate burden would be funneled clown until it reached the consuming public. See Marinelli, supra note 33, at 119;
36 IOWA L. REV. 319, 327-28 (1951). An interesting extension of this approach is the
suggestion that the public could be provided with "insurance [which] would be funded
by premiums paid by businesses." Griffin, The Beleaguered Accountants: A Defendant's
Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759, 762 (1976).
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The results of a survey conducted recently by the Practising Law Institute to which fifty accounting firms responded, none larger than
fifty members, indicates that many firms have had no difficulty in
obtaining adequate insurance coverage and that the premiums paid
are not prohibitive.115
Ten years ago, one AICPA committee forecast that an expansion
of liability would be accompanied by the necessity for the accounting
profession to charge fees which many clients would find overly
Although malpractice insurance is probably the best way to deal with the losses
caused by accountants' negligence, other interesting approaches to the problem have
been stiggested, such as the establishment of state boards which would screen out
frivolous cases, the passage of no-ihtult insurance legislation for accountants by the
states, and the protection of accountants through legalization of a right to incorporate.
See Cosby & Rubin, A Risk IangeinenIt Analisis of the CPA's Professional Liability
Exposure, J. Bus., May 1976, at 15, 24-25.
Opponents of extended liability often cite the unavailability of coverage. See, e.g.,
Louis, The Accountants Are Changing the Rules, FORTUNE, June 15, 1968, at 177;
Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law, 46
VASH. L. REV. 675, 683, 685 (1971). Others express concern over the withdrawal from
the market of carriers once willing to underwrite accountants' malpractice insurance, as
well as the rapid increase in the cost of annual premiums and size of deductible
amounts. See Bakay, A Review of Selected Claims Against Public Accoun to nts, J.
ACCOUNTANCY, May 1970, at 54, 57-58; Comment, supra, at 685; Weyrich, Exposure to
Professional Liability, N.Y.C.P.A., July 1970, at 556, 561.
Other fears that have been expressed ire that expansion of liability will force small

firms out of the public sector, discourage competitive pricing, and diminish the availability of audits to high risk clients, all of which xwill have a harmful effect on the
nation's economy. See Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered
Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675, 698-705 (1971).
Many of the insurance problems which accountants have encountered may be due
tounsophistie -Iel rate making. Increased experience will undoubtedly result in improved insurance plans. See Accountants Liabilityt Problemos, N.Y.C.P.A., March 1971, at
229, 231.
115 PLI
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259-73 (1976). The survey is not conclusive, as only 42 out of 150 accounting firms
contacted returned the survey questionnaire. But the results are, nonetheless, instructive.
The median policy limit for accountants \whio responded was $1,000,000 with the
highest deductible reported to be $1,000. Id. at 264. The premiums paid, although difficult to average because dependent upon a myriad of factors such as size and location
of the firm and the size of the deductible, were, on a $1,000,000 policy, as high as
$767.00 per member andt as low as $122.52 per member, with an apparent national
average of $357.80 per menber. Id. at 265-66.
In an apparent contrast to reported trends of increased litigation, the results of the
survey might indicate that theire is no serious cause for alarm, at least for the firms of
less than fifty members. Of 37 firms which responded, only
[s]ix firms reported one claim and two firms reported two claims during the last
five years. Three accounting firms reported that the insurance carriers had
made a payment to the claimant to settle a lawsuit, but the highest such payment was reported to be $1,700.
Id. at 271.
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excessive. 116 Eight years ago, it was reported that because of the rise
in premium costs, the largest accounting firms, some insured in excess of $10 million, were uncertain as to their ability to continue
coverage eligibility. 117 Hindsight reveals that these concerns were
largely unfounded. The ability of accounting firms, both large and
small, to presently secure adequate coverage is enhanced by the
availability of a new insurance program sponsored by the AICPA." 8
This program has been touted as "offer[ing] more coverage in higher
limits to a greater number of firms and promises greater stability than
has been the case previously." 1 19 The superiority of this plan over
those previously available is evidenced by its widespread subscription,12 0 as well as its endorsement by many state CPA societies.' 2 ' Some of the noteworthy provisions of this policy include:
(1) coverage for all claims (including all costs of legal defense) except
those involving intentional fraud; (2) coverage limits up to $5 million
where appropriate; (3) three-year premiums; (4) a "nominal range of
deductibles . . . for firms with staffs between 11 and 250"; and (5) a
22
general objective of spreading risk nationwide.1
It would appear, then, that the accounting profession has available an attractive insurance package which may very well prove to be
a major factor in stemming the tide of the profession's mounting
overhead. The broad base of the plan, as well as the growing subscription, should serve to keep premiums lower than previously anticipated. The real test of the plan may come after the first claims
surface; if each claim were to cause cancellation of the particular
insured's policy, as may threaten to be the case, the profession would
have a constantly reducing group of insured accountants. 12 3
116
117

N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1966, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
Louis, supra note 115, at 177.

11l J. ACCOUNTANCY, July 1975, at 7-8.

119 Id. at 7.
120

\Vallace E. Olson, President of the AICPA, reported in a recent letter to the

association's members that "[a]lthough the program xwas first offered in May of 1974, it

is already over twice as large as the prior AICPA plan." Letter from Wallace E. Olson to
members of the AICPA (undated) (on file at Seton Hall Law Review).
121 At least "[t]hirty state CPA societies have decided to co-sponsor the program and
others have sponsorship under consideration." J. ACCOUNTANCY, July 1975, at 7.
122 RBH/Reid & Carr, Inc., The AICPA Professional Liability Insurance Program
(1976).
123 The major carriers of the AICPA program will not release information concern-

ing their loss experience under the present program, nor their methods of determining
possible premium rates if legal liability were to be expanded. It is hoped that experience will result in coverage which is acceptable to the carriers as well as the insured
accountants.

For a discussion of how accountants can best evaluate their insurance needs see
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However, the carriers may no longer point to the increasing
claims under the federal securities laws to justify increased premiums
or cancellations, because 10b-5 violations are now maintainable only
for intentional fraud, not mere negligence, as a result of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.124 That limitation, plus the difficult burden of proving actual reliance and causation in any common law action, will serve to diminish the number of
successful suits and will further lower the costs of insurance. 125
Thus, it appears that to date there has not been any serious
threat of harm to accountants from policy cancellations or premium
increases. In the absence of any negative experience with insurance,
the "pragmatic objection" to an extension of liability for negligent
misrepresentation is no longer valid with respect to the accounting
profession.
ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

The action against an accountant does not differ substantially
from any other cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. Thus,
liability will not be imposed unless the elements of a cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation have been pleaded and proved. The
potential for unlimited liability is significantly diminished by the difficulties of proof which are presented by the complex business practices that must be examined in such a law suit.126
Reliance
The necessity of proving reliance distinguishes the common law
acion f-or neglirnt
1misrepresentation from actions brought under the
securities laws which may not require proof of reliance. 12 7 Many
Francis & Strawser, Determining the Amountt of and the Cost of Professional Liability
1
Insurmcc, MICEI. C.P.A., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 53.
124 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
125 See Editorial,
Professional Liability-A New Development, 99 N.J.L.J. 356
(1976).
126 One commentator has argued: "If' the coorts adhere to strict rules of proof of
causation, foreseeability, and reliance, the profession will not face ruin." Note, supra
note 4, at 605; see Solomon, supra note 33, at 89.
127 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v, United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54
(1972) (nondisclosure); Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975) (same).
Accountants' liability for common law negligent misrepresentation will inevitably
involve false representations rather than nondisclosure. The very nature of an audit requires the affirmative commonication of some information even if the inaccuracy results
from an omission. See Mutual Ventures v. Barondess, 17 Misc. 2d 483, 484-85, 186
N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (1959). Even in 10b-5 actions where affirmative misrepresentations
are made, proof of reliance has been required.
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courts have avoided the question of the extension of accountants' liability to third parties in common law actions by dismissing claims on
the ground that the plaintiffs, in any event, failed to plead or offer
128
proof of reliance.
In order to support a finding of liability, the "false representation
must have played a material and substantial part in leading the plaintiff to adopt his particular course." 129 A belief in the truth of the
misrepresentation must be shown, and the plaintiff's reliance must
have been justifiable.' 30 In determining whether reliance was reasonable, the court will measure the plaintiff's conduct against what a
normal member of the specific class to which the plaintiff belongs
would have believed or would have done with the misrepresentation. 131
The necessity of proving reliance will serve to limit liability significantly in actions against accountants, for
[i]n the typical commercial transaction, the creditor or investor
parting with his money often relies on many factors other than a
financial statement or legal opinion proffered by the other side.
Many investors do not bother with an audit at all, but accept contractual representations and warranties. Others bring in their own
accountants and lawyers (with whom, of course, they are in direct
privity) to conduct the necessary investigations on which they
rely. 132
Proximate Causation

Another element of the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation which involves problems of proof for plaintiffs is the need
to show causation. Not only must justifiable reliance be shown, but
the misrepresentation must also be shown to have caused the specific
injuries suffered by the plaintiff.' 3 3 The inquiry does not stop once
128 See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd,
96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976); Donovan Constr. Co. v. Woosley, 358 F. Supp. 375, 382 (W.D.
Ark. 1973).
129 PROSSER, supra note 15, § 108, at 714. The requirement of materiality will probably obviate liability for a "thoughtless slip or blunder" because no person could reasonably rely on such a representation. See id. at 718-19.
130Id. at 715; see Note, supra note 4, at 605.
131 See PROSSER, supra note 15, § 108, at 715-16.
132 Editorial, Professional Liabilit--A New Development, 99 N.J.L.J. 356 (1976).
133 See PROSSER, supra note 15, § 108, at 718. One commentator has rejected this
approach, arguing instead that because the burden of proving any kind of causation is so
onerous, "lack of causation should be an affirmative defense . . . for which the auditor
must bear the burden of proof." Comment, supra note 100, at 186-87 (footnote omitted).
In any event, the injury suffered, to be compensable, "must be established with
reasonable certainty, and mfist not be speculative or contingent," or nominal. See
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causation in fact has been shown, however. Liability will not be imposed unless the injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence. 134 It is at this point that the question of foreseeability

becomes significant. 135
The arguments earlier in this article concerning the foreseeability
of harm to third parties resulting from the negligent misrepresentations of accountants were presented to discredit the continuing viability of the absolute bar to liability which the doctrine of privity has
permitted. However, in order for liability to be imposed in any particular case, the injury to the specific plaintiff must still have been
reasonably foreseeable. Thus, a court will examine the foreseeability
of the harm suffered and make what is clearly a policy determination
of whether or not the duty of the accountant should include protecting that plaintiff from the specific kind of injury suffered. 13 6 An accountant probably should not be liable, for example, for physical injuries resulting from shock over market loss which might be traceable
to reliance on the accountant's negligent misrepresentation. Because
of the nature of the accountant's services, to be compensable the injury must undoubtedly be pecuniary and suffered by a member of a
foreseeable class of reliants.
It is in dealing with the question of proximate causation that
courts will have the opportunity to narrow the scope of accountants'
liability to third parties. The factors relevant to the balancing approach discussed previously for use in determining whether or not a
specific cause of action should be entertained initially, may also be
considered in the determination of proximate causation.
Negligence
Of course the most important element of any successful action is
proof of negligence on the part of the accountant. Liability will not
usually be imposed unless an accountant has deviated from estabPROSSER, supra note 15, § 110, at 731 (footnote omitted). If this is proved, a plaintiff
may be compensated for either "out of pocket" or "loss-of-bargain" damages, depending
upon the jurisdiction. Id. at 733-34. In Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969), the
Iowa supreme court determined that the appropriate measure of damages in an action
against an accountant for negligent misrepresentation is "[tjhe amount necessary to
place the defendant corporation in the position it would have been had the
[representation] been correct"--loss of the bargain. Id. at 407. An out-of-pocket measure
may be preferable, however, allowing loss of the bargain compensation where the damages can be established with something more than "reasonable certainty." Cf. Comment, supra note 100, at 189.
134See Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058, 1061, 1063 (D.N.D. 1974).
135 See PROSSER, supra note 15, § 43, at 257-58.
136 Id. §§ 42 & 43.
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lished professional standards. 137 The AICPA has established generally
accepted accounting standards (GAAS) governing the entire audit investigation which mandate a following of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) regarding the methods of reporting certain
kinds of facts. 13 8 While deviation may not always constitute negligence, neither should strict adherence relieve an accountant of139responsibility if the circumstances clearly required something more.
Proof of negligence may involve significant financial costs for
third parties. Despite the presence of GAAS and GAAP, expert testimony is almost always required in order to establish the "substantial
137Cf. Hawkins, supra note 13, at 802-03. In Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank
v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972), the court held that
the standards of the profession should be "the minimum standard by which liability
should be determined.'" Id. at 852 (emphasis in original).
An accountant's responsibilities do not necessarily end with the completion of an
audit. In Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court, in denying a
motion to dismiss, held that an accountant has a duty to disclose information discovered
after the completion of an audit which renders the financial statement false and misleading. Id. at 188. The court acknowledged the possibility that indeterminate liability
might result from the imposition of such a duty, but concltided that "[p]roper reconciliation of' these .. .policy considerations . .. can only be made after full development of
the facts of this case." Id. at 189.
138Fiflis, supra note 1, at 40. The AICPA has promulgated ten standards which
govern general field work and reporting standards. See AICPA STATEMENT ON
AUDITING STANDARDS

No. 1, § 150.02 (1973). Generally accepted accounting principles

are not set out specifically, but are defined by "'the accounting conventions by which
financial information is recorded, attributed to particular periods and summarily presented in the form of financial statem(nts." Strother, The Establishment of Generallyj
Accepted Accounting Principles and Generalli Accepted Auditing Standards, 28 VAND.
L. REV.201, 203 (1975) (footnote onitted). The conventions, to be "generally accepted,"
should have 'substantial authoritative support." Fiflis, supra note 1, at 41.
139 See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs,
455 F.2d 847, 852 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806-07 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 1006 (1970); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 24 CATH. U.L. REN'. 393 (1975).
Professor Fiflis has suggested that in determining legal standards of conduct a court
must look to
(a) The actual conduct of the accountant in the particular case, including
his own firm's standards, and the conduct of the engagement;
(1) Customs and practices of the profession, if any, dealing with the particular problem;
(c) Fonmal professional standards, if any, covering the situation, established
by some organization such as the AICPA, the stock exchanges or the [Financial
Accounting Standards Board];
(d) Expert testimony of appropriate conduct in the circumstances;
(e) Writings of accountants and others in treatises and journals; and
(f) The legal standard of conduct to be established for the case. Items (1),
(c), (d) and (e) often are referred to, individually or collectively, as sources of
GAAS or GAAP without discrimination.
Fiflis, stipra note 1, at 65 (footnote omitted).
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authoritative support" needed to denominate a specific principle a
GAAP14 0 and to prove the accountant's deviation from standard, generally accepted procedures.
Finally, the accountant often can limit the scope of his duties to
the client and third parties. The agreement between the accountant
and the client cannot directly limit responsibility to third parties,
however, unless the restricted nature of the engagement is clearly
set out on the face of the report. 14 1 The use of disclaimers is permissible, 142 although it is not possible to make a blanket disclaimer
of liability for all representations in the report which are made neg43
ligently. 1
CONCLUSION

Ultramares is on the wane, and rightly so!
The accounting profession is light years removed from the limited professional role it customarily played when Judge Cardozo was
reluctant to expose it to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." The demands of a consumer oriented economy, governmental regulation, constantly shifting
and more complicated taxes and tax regulations, enforcement of fedFiflis, supra note 1, at 4 1.
See M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 2d 305,
310, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (disclaimer of liability in contract does not necessarily extend
to third parties); Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, 486
("clear qualification" may act as disclaimer).
140
141

142 See
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ACCOUNTANTS,

17-19 (1967). The auditor's report may contain the following nota-

(1) "Unqualified"--an expression of the accountant's professional opinion that the
audited financial statement represents a fair and accurate presentation of the corporation's financial condition, see AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 2,
28, at 10 (1974);
(2) "Qualified"-while similar to an unqualified opinion, this expression will be
accompanied by a description of the effect certain qualifications have on the financial
29-30;
statement issued, see id.
(3) "Adverse"-indicates that the presentation of the financial statement does not
41-44;
conform with generally accepted accounting principles, see id.
(4) "Disclaimer of Opinion"-indicates that the accountant offers no opinion be45-47.
cause of the limited nature of the examination, see id.
The AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Rule 2.03 (1970) mandates that the
accountant affix one of these explanatory notations to any audited financial statement.
143 A disclaimer must be specific. The AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STIAN45, at 15 (1974) provides that whenever the independent auditor disDARDS No. 2,

claims an opinion, he should give "all of his substantive reasons for doing so." See also
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d
847, 852 (4th Cir. 1972). The effect of a disclaimer should ultimately be a question for the
jury. See C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1955).
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eral and state securities statutes aimed at fully informing the potential
investor, intricate corporate mergers and acquisitions, all have thrust
duties upon the accountant, expanded his engagement and complicated his work far beyond what might have been regarded as mere
bookkeeping duties 45 years ago.
However, such growth inevitably must bring additional responsibilities. Today, the accountant who is preparing a current audit and
reasonably demands that his client's counsel furnish appropriate information concerning loss contingencies stemming from threatened or
pending litigation, contractually assumed obligations or even unasserted possible claims or assessments himself must be prepared to
stand behind his work, no more, no less than anyone else whose services bring him in contact with the public.
It is to be remembered that an accountant never guarantees the
accuracy of his work. No one suggests that he must insure the validity
of his audit. 1 44 But, simply stated, it is reasonable to require the
accountant to prepare his statement carefully and to hold him to general standards of due care. On the other hand, as we have tried to
suggest, an attempt to define with precision all those parties to whom
the accountant should be liable would be as inequitable as rigid application of the Ultrarnaresprivily rule.
The balancing approach to such liability, which in the end depends upon a case by case analysis of the accountant's relationship to
the particular aggrieved party, offers the fairest solution to the somewhat anomalous goals of protecting the public while simultaneously
limiting the profession's exposure, thereby reducing the cost of its
necessary services to the very same public. After a few years of empirical experience with such a rule, the profession, its insurers, and
the consuming public should have adjusted to one another on a more
rational, realistic basis than now exists, and Judge Cardozo's fear of
limitless, unpredictable professional liability should become just
another imaginary horror, inevitably discarded as legal concepts keep
pace with changing social and business patterns.
144 No commentator has argued for the imposition of strict liability to accountants,
but the trend in products liability cases has been recognized as providing a possible
theoretical basis for the extension of such liability to accountants. Cf. Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A 11odern Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAUL
1
L. REv. 56, 85 (1968).

